

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #0152/01 0252244
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 252244Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8940
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS TOKYO 000152

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

NSC FOR SAMORE, HOLGATE, CONNERY; DOE FOR NA-1 D'AGOSTINO,
NA-4 AOKI, NA-20 BAKER, NA-24 WHITNEY, NA-25 MUSTIN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: [KNNP](#) [ENRG](#) [PTER](#) [ASEC](#) [JA](#)
SUBJECT: DOE DEPUTY U/S AOKI DISCUSSIONS WITH GOJ ON
NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT, PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY
RESPONSE

REF: TOKYO 120

¶1. (SBU) Summary. During meetings with DOE Deputy Under Secretary for Counterterrorism Steven Aoki January 20-22, GOJ officials discussed Japan's expected role at the Nuclear Security Summit, and reaffirmed their intent to expand bilateral cooperation on nuclear safeguards and security technology, as declared in the U.S.-Japan Joint Statement last November. Discussions with several ministries and specialized agencies also revealed what appeared to be incremental progress in strengthening the security of nuclear facilities in Japan. One surprising development was a clear statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) that it would support a bilateral arrangement for the sharing of classified or other sensitive information on nuclear and radiological security. On another issue of longstanding U.S. interest, the Cabinet Office responded favorably to a proposal to deepen bilateral cooperation on emergency response, including measures aimed at responding to potential nuclear/radiological terrorist threats. End summary.

Nuclear Security Summit

¶2. (SBU) In a meeting January 20, MOFA Director General for Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science Toshio Sano told Aoki, who was in Tokyo for an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) seminar on strengthening nuclear security in Asia, that Japan was planning for the Prime Minister to attend the Nuclear Security Summit in April. Many of DG Sano's questions were directed towards planning for the Prime Minister's attendance. In addition, he noted that Japan had submitted two comments on the draft communique and work plan: one on making sure language enabled and did not hinder peaceful uses and one on personnel. He asked about the schedule for receipt of a revised communique/work plan prior to the February meeting in The Hague and said he hoped both documents could be finished at that time.

¶3. (SBU) Sano also asked about the Summit relative to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon), indicating that he thought the Summit could be used to influence the RevCon. In reply, del noted the intention was to keep the Summit separate and narrowly focused so as not to be viewed as a precursor to the RevCon, or as a mechanism to pre-work RevCon issues, although the U.S. hopes positive momentum from the Summit will carry over to the RevCon.

¶4. (SBU) Referring to his meeting with White House WMD Coordinator Gary Samore in December, Sano said he had not been able to provide complete information regarding what

Japan is doing domestically to secure nuclear materials, and went on to describe improvements that Japan has made since 9/11. He pointed out that close ties now exist between Japanese Government regulators and industry on security. With the likely usage of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel by all of the Japanese utilities, the Government has decided to require all nuclear reactors, in addition to Japan's fuel cycle facilities, to receive 24/7 protection from on-site armed police officers reinforced by Coast Guard patrols offshore. Japanese laws were revised in 2005 to comply with INFCIRC/225/Revision 4, establishing domestic requirements for a design basis threat, a physical protection inspection system, and information confidentiality. Moreover, Japan is conducting security exercises and implementing a radioisotope export licensing system and registration system. Aoki made the point that while the steps Sano described were all positive, perception still lags reality and the Summit would be an opportunity for Japan to go on record regarding its efforts to improve the security of its nuclear power program.

While Aoki referred several times to the idea of making announcements at the Summit, Sano remained noncommittal. (Note: Before Aoki's arrival in Japan, Sano told embassy officials (reftel) that Japan did not see the Summit as a "pledge" conference and was not planning to make any announcement regarding security at Japanese nuclear facilities. In his meeting with Aoki, however, Sano did not repeat this message, even though Aoki brought up the point about announcements throughout the conversation. End note.)

15. (SBU) In a subsequent informal conversation on the margins of the IAEA seminar, Sano told Aoki that he had been tasked with identifying deliverables for the Summit. He had already decided to put forward the cooperative activities on

safeguards and security identified in the Obama-Hatoyama statement and a Japanese offer to host a regional training center for nuclear security experts. Aoki suggested that a comprehensive overview of Japanese actions to improve physical protection standards and agreements on research reactor fuel conversion could constitute another deliverable.

Cabinet Office Support for Summit, Emergency Response

16. (SBU) In a meeting January 22, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management Ito told Aoki that Japan is actively preparing for the Nuclear Security Summit and will do whatever it can to support it. Aoki expressed appreciation for Japan's leadership role for the Summit and noted the U.S. looks forward to deepening cooperation on security and counterterrorism issues. Ito said Japan acknowledges the nuclear terrorism threat is real and Japan wants to work with the U.S. on counterterrorism and emergency response. In the meeting with Ito, as well as in earlier discussions with the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Aoki reiterated the U.S. offer to hold joint workshops and exercises on nuclear/radiological emergency response. Aoki said Japanese officials would be welcome to observe U.S. exercises at the national, regional and facility level. Ito recalled that the Cabinet Office had planned to send observers to the Empire 09 exercise last June, but the officials had been forced to remain in Japan to deal with the H1N1 outbreak last spring. Aoki briefly described the U.S. proposal, originally made in 2007, to hold a workshop in Japan in which U.S. experts could demonstrate nuclear/radiological search equipment and techniques. He went on to say that, while it had not been possible to hold the workshop, the U.S. offer still stands. Ito responded that he would look into what had prevented Japan from accepting the U.S. offer and Aoki promised to write Ito a letter describing the workshop proposal in more detail, together with any offer the U.S. could make for Japanese observers to attend a future U.S. exercise.

Nuclear Security in Japan: Incremental, but significant
progress?

¶7. (SBU) In contrast to previous occasions, when GOJ officials had given a somewhat defensive response to pressure on nuclear security issues, there now seems to be a much greater sense of ownership of the nuclear security agenda on the part of Japanese Government agencies. Aoki's meetings with DG Sano and with other ministries all revealed incremental, but possibly significant, changes in the security posture at Japanese facilities. Using the introduction of MOX as a forcing function, Japan has decided that all power reactors must adopt security measures previously reserved for fuel cycle facilities, including 24/7 armed police and Coast Guard presence. Officials of NISA, in the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, on January 22 appeared comfortable acknowledging the need for armed response forces, and posting police on-site at nuclear facilities achieves that without requiring fundamental changes in Japanese law barring the possession of firearms by private entities.

¶8. (SBU) There were also numerous signs that Japan is making positive changes in how government bodies coordinate on nuclear security matters. In their January 22 meeting, NISA Deputy Director General for Industrial Safety Shingo Naito told Aoki that Japan is enhancing coordination among regulatory bodies, security organizations, and facility operators. In one indication of the enhanced coordination, Naito said he himself is a former official of the National Police Agency. The previous day, Shintaro Mitarai, Director General for Nuclear Security in the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Agency (JNES), which provides technical support to NISA, told Aoki that he, too, is a former police official.

¶9. (SBU) In his meetings with both NISA and JNES, Aoki stressed the U.S. interest in continuing to expand cooperation with Japan and noted that one area of particular interest is physical protection performance testing and field exercises. NISA official Shin-ichi Motegi on January 22

explained that in the system instituted under Japan's revised national law, regulators conduct inspections annually to check compliance with regulations and that training and exercises are also carried out. He referred briefly to one performance exercise conducted last October, which included coordination with local police. However, he acknowledged that Japan needs to conduct such exercises more widely at its nuclear facilities.

Information Sharing

¶10. (SBU) In contrast to previous discussions, DG Sano indicated MOFA would support the U.S. and Japan concluding an agreement that would allow bilateral exchanges with key technical agencies in Japan involving classified or other sensitive information on physical protection. Aoki referenced this MOFA position on January 21 while meeting with MEXT Deputy Minister Yasutaka Moriguchi and on January 22 with NISA. Both ministries indicated they would follow up with MOFA, with NISA in particular commenting they were unaware of what might have caused MOFA to reconsider its previous position that information exchanges should be done under existing mechanisms.

Expanding Nonproliferation, Security Cooperation

¶11. (SBU) In his meeting with Aoki on January 21, MEXT Deputy Minister Moriguchi reaffirmed his ministry's interest in expanding cooperation on nuclear detection technology,

forensics, nonproliferation and security. Describing MEXT's priorities in this area, Moriguchi reiterated the proposal he made last October to NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino, which included joint development of technologies for nondestructive assay of plutonium in spent fuel, ultra-trace isotopic measurements, and plutonium in-process monitoring. With the proposal having been endorsed by the President and Prime Minister last November, it remained for the experts to work out details. To that end, a team from MEXT and JAEA will visit Washington and Los Alamos in February to flesh out specific themes for increased cooperation. Moriguchi stressed that MEXT wants to make real contributions at the technical level in advanced safeguards technology and forensics. He said MEXT has sought funding to support expanded cooperation in the fiscal year 2010 budget that the Diet will be debating soon and he had "no doubt" the funds would be approved since the Prime Minister had already given his approval.

¶12. (SBU) Moriguchi also noted MEXT's interest in collaborating, in coordination with the IAEA, to offer additional training and assistance for human resource development in countries with emerging nuclear power programs. In a separate meeting, JAEA Executive Director Sohei Okada described human resources development as "especially important," saying Japan "definitely" wants to see that on the agenda for the upcoming meetings in the U.S. on safeguards cooperation. (Note: The Japanese emphasis on human factors and capacity building seemed to reflect a high level of concern about the ability of regulators in nearby countries -- e.g., China, Vietnam -- to perform, and a corresponding interest in helping with training and other human capital issues. End note.)

Research Reactor Reduced Enrichment

¶13. (SBU) Moriguchi took the opportunity to raise MEXT's concern about the disposition of fuel at the Yayoi research reactor. He noted that discussions with DOE and the Savannah River Site had not resulted in much progress and he asked Aoki to look into the matter. Aoki responded that, first, the U.S. and Japan had done a lot in the area of research reactor conversion and return of U.S.-origin fuel. He suggested Japan might want to consider announcing at an appropriate time, possibly at the Summit, the conversion of a critical assembly in Kyoto. As for Yayoi, Aoki countered that he understood there were real technical obstacles that prevented the material being shipped to Savannah River. He stressed that the USG wants the effort to succeed and DOE will continue to work with Japan to find a solution. Options that have been considered included down blending the

material, in Japan or in a third country. Ultimately, Aoki added, the solution may come down to resources. MEXT agreed to look at providing funds to support disposition, but asked the U.S. to have another look at the technical feasibility of returning the fuel to the U.S.

Cradle to Grave

¶14. (SBU) In his meetings with DG Sano on January 20 and with Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Shunsuke Kondo on January 22, Aoki gave an update on current U.S. thinking about the cradle to grave nuclear fuel management concept. He stressed that the USG did not intend this as a challenge to states like Japan with existing fuel cycle programs. Aoki noted that U.S. internal deliberations were still in relatively early stages. Kondo discussed a formulation that would call for "user countries" to hold ownership stakes in regional fuel centers that would provide assurance of supply.

¶15. This cable was cleared by Deputy Under Secretary Aoki prior to his departure from Tokyo.

